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separate themselves into autonomous realms, even 
provisionally.1 In that respect, bread-and-butter 
architecture is profoundly anti-Cartesian. Descartes 
was wrong: we should not split the ontology of the 
world into two sections, two distinct realms. Not only 
for the reason that once this is done it is impossible 
to suture them together again, nor for the reason 
that once this is done all sorts of conceptual idio-
cies follow, but also because this habit of mind, this 
stubborn image of thought, is hard to shake off in 
all sorts of other areas of thinking and theory. The 
supposed autonomy of the mind from the physical 
realm authorises – no, demands – all sorts of addi-
tional fantasies of autonomy and separation. These 
fantasies then become real, and then the separa-
tions actually exist because they are accepted and 
acted upon. Cartesianism is made concrete.
Instead of Descartes, let us try Spinoza. It is not 
just the famous question of what a body can do, 
especially if ‘a body’ is thought of materially or physi-
cally.2 (Is there not such a thing as a body of thought? 
And how is that less of a body than a so-called 
‘physical’ body?)3 As Whitehead says, the idea of 
the physical is just another habit of thought, another 
secondary phenomenon, which, in our culture, is 
subject to an almost constant error of categorisation 
that gives it a false primacy.4 Spinoza is interested 
in what a body can do because he wants to remove 
the illusion that what the body does is somehow 
determined by the mind – the mind as a free agent, 
distinct from the extended realm of objects and 
Bread-and-butter architecture starts from the 
middle. It starts from where we already are, from the 
machinery within which we are already embedded; 
or rather (since that is always the case anyhow) it 
sees this ‘starting in the middle’ as a positive possi-
bility, the positive possibility of architecture. Unlike a 
tree, it does not grow from a single seed into a hier-
archical structure, but instead operates like a little 
piece of couch grass root, left stranded between the 
paving stones, happy to carry on growing between 
them, and however much the trees or hierarchical 
thought try to stamp it out, annoyingly, it keeps on 
coming back like Le Corbusier’s grass between 
the paving slabs. It starts from the middle and it 
ends in the middle – it does not come to a conclu-
sion, it does not come to a climax but remains on 
a plateau; that is, its resources lie not in those of 
a composition that is completed, as in the strategy 
of Aristotle’s poetics or Alberti’s definition of the 
perfect work of architecture, which requires that 
nothing be added and nothing be removed in order 
to avoid spoiling it. But things are always spoilt, 
buildings above all (dust, rain, dirt, stuff, mess, 
people, life…). Bread-and-butter work is always 
already engaged in a provisional, local, practical, 
legal, contractual, personal, social and political 
situation or machine – or rather, series of multiple 
machines operating on different registers. For 
bread-and-butter architecture there is no autonomy 
and no autopoesis. There is no autonomy because 
(contra Luhmann and his followers) the machines, 
the interplay of activity, never go so far as to 
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in contrast to the more literary structures used by 
Alberti and Vitruvius.7 However, the latter two theo-
rists also analyse architecture; that is, they divide it 
into constituent parts. What Spinoza challenges us 
to try to undertake is a method of understanding that 
does not begin with the split – that does not begin 
with a dualistic or hierarchical ontology, or with the 
division of the discipline into parts.
It is this persistent split image of thought that oper-
ates as the key presumption behind Summerson’s 
article on the bread and butter of architecture.8 
Summerson is generous towards the everyday work 
of architects in their public and private offices, and 
therein lies the interest of his essay. But the under-
lying prejudice (and we are made up of prejudices, 
there is no escaping them, it is just a question of 
acknowledging and working with them) is the preju-
dice of the split, of the separation of the high and the 
low, of the difference between two realms, one of 
which is elevated above the other or transcendent 
in relation to the other. Is there not a condescending 
tone in Summerson’s piece? Despite its generosity, 
does it not remain de haut en bas? In his essay 
we are clearly dealing with the same structure of 
thought that makes Lincoln Cathedral architecture 
and the bicycle shed mere building, as Pevsner 
famously noted.9 At the same time, Summerson 
sets a challenge:
It is competence and quality we need most at the 
moment, not the vanity of trying to fly level with the 
poet-innovator Le Corbusier, or the stupidity (as it 
seems to me) of being more interested in getting a 
few exciting, immaculate, individual results than in 
getting the roots of architecture untangled and prop-
erly planted in the soil where they belong.10
What I wish to explore here is the question of 
whether we can escape Summerson’s sense of 
condescension towards the bread and butter; and, if 
so, what possibilities are opened up by fleeing from 
this way of thinking about things. Is bread-and-butter 
the senses. The extraordinary moment in Spinoza 
is where he proclaims the sameness of mind and 
body, both being made from the same substance, 
the same nature – and again, substance here 
should not be thought of as a material substrate, but 
more abstractly – a substance that encompasses 
within its nature both body and mind. What distin-
guishes the mind and the body is not that they are 
of a different nature, but that they are two modes 
or manners of the same thing: ‘Body and mind are 
one and the same thing, conceived now under 
the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute 
of Extension.’5 We could say that what this then 
generates is a profound connection between mind 
and body, were it not for the fact that a ‘connection’ 
is unnecessary since it implies a prior separation, 
which for Spinoza (in contrast to Descartes) does 
not exist. The mind is nothing other than the idea of 
the body, no more and no less. It makes no sense, 
in this un-split world of Spinoza, to claim that the 
mind controls the body, because how can some-
thing be in control of the same thing – the very thing 
it is itself? ‘Control’ already implies a split between 
two things, one controlled (body) and one doing the 
controlling (mind). This is the Cartesian approach: 
to maintain the split and give control of extended 
things to spirit or mind. Cartesianism is thus a split 
ontology, an ontology of two realms, whereas what 
Spinoza gives us is a flat or immanent ontology, an 
ontology where there is no transcendence of one 
realm over another, no evaluation of a higher realm 
(mind) over a lower realm (body).
More generally, there is a persistent ‘habit of 
the split’ or ‘habit of the cut’ in architectural theory. 
Architectural theorists made a fateful decision to 
take Aristotle too seriously – in particular at the 
beginning of Physics where he states that in order 
to understand something we must analyse it; that is, 
we must cut things up into their parts.6 John Onians 
has shown how Francesco di Giorgio’s architecture 
treatises of the late fifteenth century were particu-
larly indebted to the method described in Physics, 
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Corbusier’s use and to that of Deleuze. A machine 
is not a mechanical device where the movement of 
certain parts is determined by other parts; it is more 
like an ecology, a series of interplaying elements 
or particles. As Deleuze and Parnet explain in 
Dialogues II: 
Machine, machinism, “machinic”: this does not mean 
either mechanical or organic. Mechanics is a system 
of closer and closer connections between dependent 
terms. The machine by contrast is a “proximity” 
grouping between independent and heterogeneous 
terms.12
A machine is an assemblage of things, a more 
or less open set of things that interrelate. One of 
Deleuze’s favourite examples concerns tools and 
technology; he and Guattari often mention the 
assemblage of the stirrup, the horse and the knight:
The tetravalence of the assemblage. Taking the 
feudal assemblage as an example, we would have 
to consider the interminglings of bodies defining 
feudalism: the body of the earth and the social body; 
the body of the overlord, vassal, and serf; the body of 
the knight and the horse and their new relation to the 
stirrup; the weapons and tools assuring a symbiosis of 
bodies – a whole machinic assemblage.13
We are always already involved in such assem-
blages or machines, assemblages that operate by 
means of a symbiosis. (We see here how Deleuze 
is constantly proposing an understanding of things 
based on showing the connections between them. 
In its opposition to the cut, to analysis, Deleuze’s 
thinking stays true to Spinoza’s flat and immanent 
ontology, and particularly to the oneness of thought 
and thing.) Although technology and tools are 
a part of this sort of assemblage, they are never 
primary or determinative because the assemblages 
with which we are involved are intrinsically social 
from the outset: for Deleuze, ‘every assemblage is 
collective’.14
architecture necessarily consigned to ‘competence 
and quality’, important though these are? Is it mere 
vanity to try to fly with the poetry of Le Corbusier? 
How would the competent architect do that? And, as 
has already been hinted, perhaps this is to do with 
the type of roots one wishes to put down, or the type 
of machine that architecture might be. Summerson’s 
roots are clearly those of the traditional hierarchy 
of architecture, not the messy and tangled ones 
that were mentioned above. My claim here is that 
one task of architectural theory is surely to survey 
the existing symptomatology of the discipline and 
propose a new table of disorders, a new casting of 
phenomena and thought in order to open up new 
possibilities for architecture, and in this case a new 
possibility that undercuts this conceptual difference 
between the competent and the poetic. It would not 
just be a questioning of existing circumstances but 
the proposing of new ones. As Deleuze puts it:
There is always a great deal of art involved in the 
grouping of symptoms, in the organisation of a table 
where a particular symptom is dissociated from 
another […] and forms the new figure of a disorder or 
illness. Clinicians who […] renew a symptomatological 
table produce a work of art; conversely, artists are 
clinicians […] of civilisation. It seems, moreover, that 
an evaluation of symptoms might only be achieved 
through a novel.11
What this implies is that theory indeed will become 
something other than analysis in the attempt to 
propose something new, because the thought 
that does this will not be content with splitting 
architecture into parts but must necessarily be inte-
grative – in other words must have more the nature 
of a novel or a work of art than the tone of a treatise.
I said at the outset that bread-and-butter archi-
tecture starts from the middle, in the sense that it is 
embedded in a series of machines which are always 
already at work. The term ‘machine’ should be 
understood as a positive term, referring both to Le 
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depreciate the common or garden variety of exist-
ence that has a place for the ordinary woman or 
man, for the journeyman or the artisan. Contrast 
this with the usual definition of architecture: we 
still have not done for architecture what Heidegger 
demands at the beginning of Being and Time - we 
have not clarified what its manner of being is, we 
have not laid out a clear ontology of architecture, 
and this leaves it conceptually and ontologically 
confused. And this confusion maintains within it, 
not coincidentally, a nihilistic contrast between the 
‘low’ and the ‘high’, between the bike shed and the 
cathedral.15
Architecture is still almost invariably regarded as 
building, but with something ‘added’, some supple-
ment, which makes it approach the poetic or the 
work of art. We are within what Deleuze will call, 
following his interpretation of Nietzsche, a nihilistic 
way of thinking which, contrary to the vulgar use of 
the term, defines nihilism as the depreciation of our 
current existence, our middle-of-the-way life, our 
intramundane, bread-and-butter daily occurrences. 
Nihilism deprecates our life in the name of a beyond, 
in the name of a transcendent or ideal realm; and 
it is the nasty, priestly task of nihilism to make us 
ashamed of who we are by comparison with that 
ideal realm (and for Deleuze there are plenty of 
secular priests too – psychoanalysis, for example, 
or some of the priests of architectural theory).16 An 
ontology of everyday architecture would be anti-
nihilistic in that it takes as its positive possibility 
the machines of the everyday, the machines within 
which we constantly operate. Such an ontology 
of architecture would act to destroy the desire for 
architecture and architectural theory to even pose 
the question about the difference between bread-
and-butter architecture and high architecture.
A reader of Nietzsche, Le Corbusier was 
anti-nihilistic in this way.17 This is why there is a 
profound connection between his most misquoted 
and mistranslated aphorism and the way in which 
There are other types of assemblage – for 
instance, geological assemblages or weather 
systems – that do not involve human or animal 
agency and therefore do not have a social compo-
nent. But here we are concerned with what Deleuze 
and Guattari call the alloplastic stratum; that is, 
the part of reality which relates to us. One notice-
able aspect of many architectural interpretations of 
Deleuze’s thought is that they avoid reference to 
the alloplastic, which from the beginning to end of 
Deleuze’s thought is the stratum that interests him 
most. The result is an overly physicalist, materialist 
and formal use of this philosophy of architectural 
theory and practice, a bias which it seems neces-
sary to begin to correct.
Tools and technology only develop as part of an 
assemblage that is already underway, and which 
can become more or less transformed by the sudden 
reinterpretation or invention of a piece of technology 
or a tool. But the ‘particles’ or ‘bodies’ from which 
an assemblage is formed are hugely varied in type 
and include the list of matters I mentioned earlier 
that form the bread and butter of architecture: provi-
sional and inherently local and practical matters 
such as legal and contractual systems, personal 
hopes and interests, and social and political situa-
tions. At a high level of abstraction, we can extend 
this list to include the intellectual and philosophical 
milieu within which the assemblage operates, which 
is more or less acknowledged but all the more 
powerful if not acknowledged.
What would we ask of an ontology of everyday 
architecture? Precisely that it acknowledges these 
multiple machines, this whole ecology which makes 
up the bread and butter of existence in any archi-
tecture office. Here, acknowledgment means not 
simply acceptance or resignation, but rather seeing 
this complex ecology as the positive possibility 
of architecture, and this is the reason for citing 
Deleuze’s philosophy in this context: it is one of the 
very few which ‘begins in the middle’ and does not 
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spirit. Strictly speaking, therefore, within this schema 
Le Corbusier’s sentence makes no sense, because 
it is saying that within, or with regard to a physical 
object (architecture) there exists a spiritual quality 
of poetry. The way we would traditionally get around 
this is to say that what Le Corbusier really means 
is that when we (the human subject) approach the 
work of architecture, we will have a poetic emotion 
or feeling, and that he is writing ‘poetically’ in putting 
it in this more obscure way.
Let us try, instead, to read it through Spinoza, 
through a non-Cartesian mode of thought. For 
Spinoza, as we have seen, body and mind are 
essentially the same thing; there is no separation 
between the two. Architecture, therefore, within this 
schema of thought, can be both body and mind. 
What I do not wish to posit here is any mystical 
vibrancy of matter, any vitalism.22 So how can archi-
tecture be both body and mind? What ontology of 
architecture would permit that? Simply, an ontology 
that posits architecture as a machine assem-
blage of the type that Deleuze presents us with, 
a machinic assemblage that, I submit, takes one 
of its hints already from Le Corbusier’s house-as-
machine. What are the particles that make up this 
machinic assemblage? What things are in interplay 
within this mobile ecology, this symbiosis? Again, 
the answer is straightforward: architecture consists 
of the machinic interplay of people and place; that 
is, it is a subtle mixture of what Cartesianism would 
separate into body and mind. And it is this subtle, 
interwoven and mobile mixture without any hint of 
mysticism, because we can clearly and distinctly 
outline what the set of particles are (people, society, 
the physical building…) that make up this thing 
called architecture.
When Le Corbusier says that the house is a 
machine for living, what he is positing is a new 
ontology of architecture whereby the house is 
not the physical building, but rather the interplay 
between the building and those who come to inhabit 
Deleuze takes up the notion of the machine. ‘Une 
maison est une machine-à-habiter’ is persis-
tently and wilfully misunderstood as a reference 
to the machine aesthetic and a sour pragmatics of 
housing, whereas the context within Vers une archi-
tecture makes it clear that this is a poetic question 
at the same time as a pragmatic one.18 But then, 
unless one accepts a flat ontology, unless one 
begins with the prejudice that we will not split the 
world into high / low, poetry / pragmatics, matter 
/ spirit, it is impossible to do anything other than 
misinterpret the phrase. In turn, the phrase is often 
mistranslated as ‘a house is a machine for living in’, 
which destroys Le Corbusier’s intended meaning 
that the house is a machine for living. It is not a 
question of inserting life into the house, conceived 
as a machine or otherwise. The house is architec-
ture. The house is architecture as machine. It is a 
machine in exactly the manner that Deleuze later 
explicates; and this is not by coincidence, because 
in using the term ‘machine’ he is making reference 
to its history, to its hinterland of use in Le Corbusier’s 
famous phrase. At the end of Deleuze’s final book, 
What is Philosophy?, the remarks about the foun-
dational status of architecture for all art, and how it 
derives from the machinic / ecological practices of 
the animal, are further indications of this.19
Why, or in what way, is the house, as house, 
architecture? A clue comes from another of Le 
Corbusier’s aphorisms in Vers une architecture 
when he says that ‘architecture only exists where 
there is a poetic emotion’.20 How should we read 
this, which again, like the sentence about the 
machinic house, seems oddly phrased? Let us first 
try to read it via a Cartesian mode of thought. Within 
that prejudice, one takes as a conceptual given that 
the mind is distinct and separate from the material 
body it inhabits. Within this conceptual schema or 
‘image of thought’ (as Deleuze sometimes names 
it), architecture is within the realm of the physical; it 
is a building with a physical presence.21 Poetry, on 
the other hand, is of the free realm of the mind or 
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Manley Hopkins. We can gain a sense of what 
Deleuze means by a machinic assemblage with 
respect to something like architecture by quoting 
Hopkins’ poem ‘Duns Scotus’ Oxford’:
Towery city and branchy between towers;
Cuckoo-echoing, bell-swarmèd, lark-charmèd, rook-
racked, river-rounded;
The dapple-eared lily below thee; that country and 
town did
Once encounter in, here coped and poisèd powers;
Thou hast a base and brickish skirt there, sours
That neighbour-nature thy grey beauty is grounded
Best in; graceless growth, thou hast confounded
Rural, rural keeping – folk, flocks, and flowers.
Yet ah! this air I gather and I release
He lived on; these weeds and waters, these walls are 
what
He haunted who of all men most sways my spirits to 
peace;
Of realty the rarest-veinèd unraveller; a not
Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece;
Who fired France for Mary without spot.
Hopkins attempts to overcome the sequential 
nature of spoken language and to speak all at once 
of an Oxford ‘cuckoo-echoing, bell-swarmed […] 
here coped and poised powers.’ This is Oxford as a 
machinic assemblage, as haecceities. A haecceity 
is not ‘a décor or backdrop that situates subjects’, 
but ‘it is the entire assemblage in its individuated 
aggregate’.25 The horse-in-the-street-at-noon (read 
together almost as one word) is such a haecceity, 
such an affective assemblage according to Deleuze, 
as is the towery-cuckoo-echoing-city-of-Oxford.
Deleuze and Guattari say:
We must avoid an oversimplified conciliation, as 
though there were on the one hand formed subjects 
it. And when he states that architecture is a poetic 
emotion, we should take this quite literally, because 
we can see clearly that within this individual thing 
‘architecture’, which is made up of what we usually 
like to keep separate (us, buildings…), there can 
occur and should occur a poetry, a poetry that 
would be an integral part of that assemblage, that 
individual.
Deleuze, following Spinoza, goes so far as to 
say that we must rethink the ‘individual’. We can 
recast the table of symptoms; if we wish, we can 
jettison the common or garden, bread-and-butter 
manner of defining the individual and say that the 
individual is not the object (or subject), but rather 
an assemblage made up of what we so often (in 
our unconscious Cartesianism) wish to keep sepa-
rate. Architecture is an individual, but an individual 
that consists of place-people-event all at once, 
thought all at once. The connecting hyphen, the 
drawing-together-under-one that it marks, as with 
the machine-à-habiter, is an implementation of 
this anti-Cartesianism. Deleuze and Guattari use 
it often: for instance, the ‘draft horse-omnibus-
street,’23 and ‘WASP-TO ENCOUNTER-ORCHID’24 
are two of their favourite examples. It is not a ques-
tion of considering the horse standing in the street, 
or the omnibus to which the horse is attached, but 
the whole assemblage of the horse acting together 
with the bus which it pulls along the street, and the 
street where it is pulled – an assemblage which 
depends on the fine tuning of each of the parts to 
the others in order to function. It is not a question 
of considering either the wasp in its evolution or the 
orchid alone, but rather their a-parallel evolution, 
their symbiosis, the event of their interplay.
Deleuze gives these sorts of assemblages a 
particular name: ‘haecceities’. The term comes from 
the Scholastic philosopher John Duns Scotus, and 
refers to the ‘thisness’ of a thing, its particularity. In 
literature, the term is well known for having been 
used by the early twentieth-century poet Gerard 
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implement social repression. For Foucault, archi-
tecture enacts discipline, it enacts power (pouvoir), 
and it must be resisted. Although we have posited 
a non-Cartesian ontology of architecture, this is not 
to argue – quite the contrary – that all must neces-
sarily be well within such a space.
What Deleuze and Guattari do in A Thousand 
Plateaus, however, is to make Foucault’s assem-
blages into something positive. They remove the 
negative aspect of the dispositif in Foucault. As they 
state in a long footnote:
Our only points of disagreement with Foucault are 
the following: (1) to us the assemblages seem funda-
mentally to be assemblages not of power but of desire 
(desire is always assembled), and power seems to 
be a stratified dimension of the assemblage; (2) the 
diagram and abstract machine have lines of flight that 
are primary, which are not phenomena of resistance or 
counterattack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of 
creation and deterritorialization.28
What does this mean? Firstly, the transformation 
from power to desire is a transformation from the 
necessarily repressive nature of power in Foucault 
to the positive movement of desire in A Thousand 
Plateaus. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is 
essentially positive; in contrast to psychoanal-
ysis, desire, for them, has nothing to do with lack. 
Secondly, the assemblages allow for ‘lines of flight’, 
and these ‘lines of flight’ are primary. Lines of flight, 
or lines of fleeing, are possibilities for creativity, for 
escape from a prevailing system of organisation, 
and these possibilities of and for creativity are not 
a side-effect, they are not a supplement or an addi-
tion to the ontology, but rather form the very basis or 
element of that ontology.
Deleuze and Guattari often express this by 
means of the term ‘plane of consistency’. The 
plane of consistency is like an underlying primary 
field or element within which things are cast, onto 
of the thing or person type [i.e., us], and on the other 
hand spatiotemporal coordinates of the haecceity type 
[i.e., architecture]. For you will yield nothing to haec-
ceities unless you realise that that is what you are, that 
you are nothing but that.26
We are the haecceity that occurs, the affect that 
occurs within the architectural machinic assem-
blages of which we are a part. And since we are 
nothing but the haecceity of architecture, it becomes 
clear why architecture, for Le Corbusier, is a poetic 
emotion: it is because within this haecceity of archi-
tecture there is from the outset, and always already 
included, an ‘us’, a people, a ‘particle’ of this haec-
ceity which can experience the poetic.
We have gone from a consideration of bread-
and-butter architecture to the poetry of architecture, 
but the issue is that within this flat ontology there is 
no necessary distinction between the two; there is 
no supplement that needs to be added to the bread 
and butter of architecture to give us its poetry. Both 
operate within the haecceity of architecture: archi-
tecture as assemblage. But this does not mean to 
say that bread-and-butter architecture is necessarily 
poetic – or even benign. On the contrary, the most 
evil architecture is that architecture which under-
stands only too well how to operate the machinic 
assemblage that includes its inhabitants. We might 
think of the concentration camp, for instance. In his 
book on Foucault, Deleuze cites the latter’s interest 
in Bentham’s Panopticon; it is the example of the 
prison that leads Foucault to his own interpretation 
of the assemblage or dispositif (device, apparatus, 
system), an interpretation to which Deleuze acknowl-
edges his debt.27 The idea of the assemblage, as 
well as having roots in Le Corbusier, makes explicit 
reference to Foucault’s work on the prison and the 
military camp: on buildings that become architec-
ture in order to discipline, in order to control. This 
notion of the assemblage, therefore, comes both 
from architecture and also from a place where archi-
tecture can be evil, or at least can represent and 
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always has a supplementary dimension, a tran-
scendence that controls what it organises. The plane 
of consistency, on the other hand, has nothing to do 
with subjects or objects, nor with forms; it works with 
haecceities, not things regarded as separate items, 
and it deals with intensities.
The key thing is that the plane of organisation 
is derived from – is an affect-effect of – the plane 
of consistency. This is what Deleuze and Guattari 
mean when they say that the plane of consistency 
is primary, or that lines of fleeing/flight are primary. 
To follow a line of fleeing means to escape the plane 
of organisation and to return to the plane of consist-
ency, which always remains in place as a possibility.
To return to the bread and butter of architecture: 
architecture is always subject to a plane of organisa-
tion, a work space which must be controlled, more or 
less, by the pragmatics of economics, construction, 
function, longevity, law… This is a part of the disci-
pline of architecture well portrayed by Summerson 
in his essay. And when he calls for competence and 
quality in architecture, it is, in Deleuze’s terms, the 
plane of organisation to which he is referring. For 
Deleuze, the plane of organisation is not a nega-
tive thing. Although it is ‘opposed’ to the plane of 
consistency, this opposition is not to do with an 
evaluation. Organisation is necessary, inevitable, 
and neither good nor bad in itself. The opposition 
Deleuze points to is a non-evaluated difference 
between the two planes. What should be under-
stood within the situation of the bread-and-butter 
architecture office is that the multiple organisations 
within which opposition happens, occur only on the 
basis of a plane of consistency that always provides 
the chance for a line of fleeing, for moments of crea-
tivity. It is always possible to return to the plane of 
consistency, to set aside the pre-established forms 
of the organisation within which one operates and 
propose a difference, something new; it is possible 
to make an opening.
which things ‘take’ and organise themselves. This 
plane of consistency is a field made up of multiple 
differences, movements, flows; it is out of these 
differences that individualities are formed, and 
these individualities are both things within the world, 
and our common or garden ways of thinking about 
things. (In Deleuze and Guattari there is a peculiar 
rocking backwards and forwards between the two, 
a strange movement or ambiguity that derives from 
the moment in Spinoza where the unity of thought 
and thing – mentioned above – is asserted.) A 
distinction is drawn by Deleuze between this Plane 
of Consistence and a Plane of Organisation:
We should distinguish between two planes, two 
types of planes. On the one hand, a plane that could 
be called one of organization. It concerns both the 
development of forms and the formation of subjects. 
It is therefore, as much as one wishes, structural and 
genetic. In any case, it possesses a supplementary 
dimension, one dimension more, a hidden dimen-
sion, since it is not given for itself, but must always 
be concluded, inferred, induced on the basis of what it 
organizes […]. And then there is a completely different 
plane which does not deal with these things: the plane 
of Consistence. This other plane knows only rela-
tions of movement and rest, of speed and slowness, 
between unformed, or relatively unformed, elements, 
molecules or particles borne away by fluxes. It knows 
nothing of subjects, but rather what are called “haec-
ceities”. In fact no individuation takes place in the 
manner of a subject or even of a thing. An hour, a day, 
a season, a climate, one or several years – a degree 
of heat, an intensity, very different intensities which 
combine – have a perfect individuality which should 
not be confused with that of a thing or of a formed 
subject.29
We see clearly here the differences that have been 
the topic of this essay: the plane of organisation 
deals with things in the manner of a Cartesian split 
ontology; it deals with forms (the extended realm 
of objects) and subjects (the realm of thought). It 
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Architecture, likewise, is an assemblage made up 
of such heterogeneous particles. As a discipline it 
has a messy set of dimensions that seem to relate to 
organisation, among them law, function, contracts, 
buildability, budget and so forth. But consistent with 
these, on the same plane, intermingled, can be 
other particles such as the memory of a place, the 
fixation with a certain form (the hand, for instance), 
the repetition of elements (the repeated brick, the 
repeated window), autobiographical moments, 
translations from literature, poetic emotion… There 
is an assemblage occurring here which involves the 
interplay of all these elements under the auspices of 
the architect, the one who has the chance to leave 
the plane of organisation and engage on the level 
of the plane of consistency. But since the plane of 
organisation occurs only on the plane of consist-
ency, and since, as Deleuze states, the plane of 
consistency does not exist prior to the plane of 
organisation, but rather each is immanent in the 
other, this does not require any magic; all that is 
needed is that the law of organisation or develop-
ment is not allowed to overturn the consistency of 
these interplaying elements.
At the end of this passage on Schumann, 
Deleuze and Parnet speak about us. What is our 
relation to this Schumann-assemblage? This 
assemblage is clearly one of composition, of the 
moment when a work is put together. How do 
we relate to this moment of composition? In the 
simplest manner possible: we just need to listen. 
The moment of listening is the moment when we 
become a part of this compositional assemblage. 
The haecceity is Clara-middle finger-ritornello-
intermezzi-listener, all interplaying. Schumann has 
put together a block of stuff (Clara-finger-ritornello-
intermezzi) into which the particle of the listener 
is inserted to make another individual (the whole 
assemblage/haecceity), which is then the haecceity 
of music. Music includes the listener; the ontology 
of music is neither its composition nor its playing, 
but its interplaying. What Deleuze proposes here is 
In a beautiful passage, Deleuze and Parnet illus-
trate this with reference to Schumann:
Guattari speaks of a Schumann-assemblage. What 
is a musical assemblage like this, designated by a 
proper name? What are the dimensions of such an 
assemblage? There is the relationship with Clara, 
woman-child-virtuoso, the Clara line. There is the little 
manual machine that Schumann puts together to hold 
the middle finger tight and secure the independence of 
the fourth finger. There is the ritornello, the little ritor-
nellos which haunt Schumann and run through all his 
work like so many childhood blocs, a whole concerted 
enterprise of involution, restraint and exhaustion of the 
theme and form. And there is also the use of the piano, 
this movement of deterritorialization which carries 
away the ritornello (‘wings have sprouted on the child’) 
on a melodic line, in an original polyphonic assem-
blage capable of producing dynamic and affective 
relations of speed or slowness, of delay or anticipation 
which are very complex, on the basis of an intrinsically 
simple or simplified form. There is the intermezzo, or 
rather there is nothing but intermezzi in Schumann, 
making the music pass to the middle preventing the 
sound plane from toppling under a law of organization 
or development. All of this is articulated in the consti-
tutive assemblage of desire. It is desire itself which 
passes and moves. There is no need to be Schumann. 
Listen to Schumann.30
The assemblage of Schumann – the composing 
machine – is comprised of a miscellaneous, messy 
set of ‘particles’ of hugely varying types: his love 
of Clara Schumann; the way he holds his middle 
finger as he plays; the structure of ‘little phrases’ 
(ritornellos) which make up his compositions; the 
way he is always working from the middle, in inter-
mezzi, so that above all he avoids being tied to a 
plane of musical organisation. Not that organisa-
tion is lacking, it is just that it does not become 
primary – there is always a return to the plane of 
consistency, to a plateau maintained in the middle.
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